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30 March 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

, DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release

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
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30 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

Congo: According to the UN representative in Elisabethville, the movement of Tshombé's forces against Manono has begun. The Katanga forces, which number about 1,000, apparently plan to make a gradual advance on the town from the three centers of Mitwaba, Kongolo, and Piana Mwanga; according to reports of Swedish UN patrols, the troops advancing from Mitwaba may already have progressed halfway to Manono without encountering serious opposition. The UN official said that the size of the advancing force would make it impossible for the small Nigerian unit at Manono to interpose itself effectively.

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(Backup, Page 4) (Map)

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Somali Republic - USSR:

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED] Although moderate government leaders have often stated a preference for Western aid, they feel pressed by a small but vocal Communist-influenced opposition party which would exploit the issue in a constitutional referendum set for 20 June. [REDACTED]
 (Backup, Page 6)

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North Vietnam - Morocco: North Vietnam's campaign to gain wider international acceptance moved another step forward with the announcement on 27 March that Morocco had agreed to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors. The agreement caps a five-day visit to Rabat by North Vietnam's foreign minister, who has been touring Africa for the past month. Morocco is the fourth African nation to recognize the Vietnamese Communist regime in the past year, following Guinea, Mali, and Senegal. [REDACTED]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[REDACTED] On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

A. and B. No change from last week.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

[REDACTED] There are continuing indications that Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla groups in South Vietnam will probably engage in a vigorous extensive campaign of sabotage and political terrorism in connection with and prior to the

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED] 25X1

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South Vietnamese presidential elections scheduled for
9 April.

D. CONGO

Although conditions in the Congo remain unsettled, there
are no new developments affording increased opportuni-
ties for exploitation by the Communist Bloc.

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Situation in the Congo

The UN is taking no military action to meet the threat to Manono, according to a 28 March report from the American army attaché in Leopoldville. General McKeown, the UN military commander, has been in Elisabethville attempting to persuade Tshombé to call off the offensive, but the Katanga government has given no indication that it will yield to UN pressure.

[The Belgian consul general in Elisabethville told the American consul on 28 March that between 85 and 90 Belgians now serving with Tshombé's forces would leave by mid-April. This total includes both military technicians under contract to the Katanga government and volunteers recruited for the white legion. About 240 Belgians were serving with the Katanga military in January, and the number may have increased since then. The consul general feared that small numbers of white volunteers might still be coming into Katanga. He hinted that Brussels might have to withdraw more Belgians as a result of international pressure, but he implied that the Belgian Foreign Ministry has little control over the Ministry of African Affairs, which apparently is continuing its assistance to Tshombé.]

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Soviet Mission Visits Somali Republic

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[Since the Somali Republic became independent last July, the Soviet Union has established a large embassy in Mogadis-
cio, and advance parties have arrived from Prague and Peiping to establish embassies. Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary arranged last year to set up diplomatic missions, but these have not yet arrived.]

[Abdirascid's government, which has been in power since the territory became independent, believes it must demonstrate substantial progress in economic development in order to win a clear-cut victory in the June referendum. The referendum is being held to approve or reject the draft constitution, which provides for national elections every five years. If approved, the referendum will in effect prolong the tenure of the present government for that period. The leftist Great Somali League (GSL), which has received financial support from Communist countries, almost certainly would seize on the government's refusal to accept Soviet aid as an important issue in its expected vigorous campaign to defeat the referendum.]

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North Vietnam and Morocco Establish Diplomatic Relations

North Vietnam and the four African nations with which it has succeeded in establishing relations have French as a common language, and each had experienced French political domination. In the joint communiqué issued in Rabat, as in similar communiqués throughout the foreign minister's tour, this kinship was stressed.

In his audience with King Hassan II on 24 March, Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem extended an invitation from Ho Chi Minh to visit North Vietnam. He also assured the Moroccans of support for their claim to Mauritania and in turn received assurances of Moroccan support for North Vietnam's efforts to reunify Vietnam "peacefully."

Morocco established diplomatic relations with South Vietnam last year, and Ambassador Buu Hoi took up residence in Rabat in mid-December. While the North Vietnamese are less sensitive than the Chinese Communists about the diplomatic complexities of such a situation, they probably hope that Saigon's ambassador can be removed. Replying to a reporter's question during his Rabat visit, Khiem pointed out that in the case of Mali, the South Vietnamese representative had been ousted soon after the arrival of Hanoi's envoy. Actually, Mali's action at that time resulted primarily from the prior presentation by Saigon's chargé of a formal note explaining South Vietnam's likely reaction in the event Mali recognized Hanoi. This was interpreted by Mali as an ultimatum and an inadmissible interference in its "internal affairs."

North Vietnam already has resident ambassadors in Guinea and Mali. Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem's delegation has recently concluded an economic and cultural agreement in Conakry and a cultural pact in Bamako.

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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